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Shifting Boundaries of the Right of Self-DefenceAppraising the Impact of the September 11 Attacks
on Jus Ad Bellum
DR.

YuTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI*

I. Introduction
The attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 has
sparked a hot debate on the adequacy of the current international law framework and how
it will face the increasing challenge of the use of force by non-State actors.' The ensuing
military actions pursued by the U.S.-led coalition against the Taliban regime and al Qaeda
in Afghanistan since October 7, 20012 poses palpably complex issues injus ad bellum and in
jus in bello. In respect to the former domain of international law, intractable questions remain. These questions are in regard to how to provide legal explanations for U.S. military
operation in light of both the U.N. Charter and customary international law.
It is possible to argue that Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, which recognize
the "inherent right" of self-defence,' implicitly authorize the exercise of such a right pred*Lecturer in International Law and Human Rights Law, Kent Law School, and Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent, Canterbury, United Kingdom; Visiting Professor at University of Trent,
Italy. The author would like to express his gratitude to ProfessorJames Crawford for his comments on earlier
drafts.
1. See Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and InternationalLaw after 11 September, 51 INT'L &COMP.
L. Q. 401 (2002); Antonio Cassese, Terrorismis also DisruptingSome CrucialLegal CategoriesofInternationalLaw,
12 EUR.J. INT'L L. 993 (2001); L. Condorelli, Lesattentatsdu 11 septembre et leurssuites:oi va le droitinternational?
105 REVUE G9N9RALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (RGDIP) 829 (2001); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary

Practiceofthe United States, 96 AM.J. INT'L L. 237 (2002); NicoJ. Schrijver, Responding to lnternationalTerrorim:
Moving the Frontiersof InternationalLawfor 'EnduringFreedom'?NETH. INT'L L. REV. 271(2001); see also EURO.
J. INT'L L., The Attack on the World Trade Centre: Legal Responses, Discussion Forum (2001), at http://
www.ejil.org/forum-NTC/index.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
2. On that day, approximately fifty Tomahawk cruise missiles were launched from both U.S. ships and
submarines, and a U.K. submarine against targets near Kabul, and Taliban bases in Kandahar, Jalalabad, and
Mazar-i-Sharif. On top of these, bombings were also carried out on the same day by fifteen U.S. long-range
B-i, B-2, and B-52 bombers as well as twenty-five F-14 and F/A-18 strike aircraft. 47 Keesing's Record ofWorld
Events I1, at 44391-92 (2001).
3. See generally CONSTANTINE ANTONOPOULOS, THE UNILATERAL USE OF FORCE BYSTATES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1997) [hereinafter UNILATERAL USE OF FORCE]; Constantine Antonopoulos, The UnilateralUse of Force by
States after the End of the Cold War, 4J. ARMED CONFLICT L. 117-160 (1999) [hereinafter End of the Cold War];

1082

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

icated on customary international law. The argument that the customary international rule
on self-defence does not call for an "armed attack," the explicit precondition under Article
51, is contested. Such an argument risks separating the content of the customary rule far
apart from the ambit of Article 51 and undermining the intertwined relationship between
customary international law and the U.N. Charter.4
There is, however, an argument that the military operation against the al Qaeda organization in Afghanistan could be justified as a stretch, rather than a complete over-haul of
the pre-existing customary international law. Military action could be viewed as the right
to self-defence when used against alleged or real terrorist bases operating on the soil of
other States failing or unable to prevent terrorist attacks. Although the development of
international law since September 11, 2001 has not come to embrace such a controversial
doctrine of indirect aggression per se, the acquiescence of international community in the
military action pursued by the United States and its allies can be approximated to the
possibility that such an extensive mode of self-defence without consent of a territorial State
may be tolerated in certain exceptional circumstances. On the other hand, the exercise of
self-defence against the Taliban regime, namely the State of Afghanistan itself, raises more
intractable issues. It must be questioned whether the September 11th attacks could be
deemed as acts of the State of Afghanistan, with its responsibility for these internationally
wrongful acts in turn enabling it to be the legitimate target of self-defence action conducted
by the United States and its allied force. Even if that question is answered in the negative,
it seems clear that the Taliban's responsibility was engaged for its failure to prevent and
punish acts of international terrorism committed by al Qaeda, including its refusal to hand
over Osama bin Laden, in contravention to a series of the Security Council's resolutions.
This article is intended to furnish an analysis of only the jus ad bellum aspects of the
military operation against Afghanistan, leaving aside discussions on issues ofjus in bello.
Since the resort to armed force against al Qaeda and the Taliban was already made, this
article seeks to offer a disinterested and thorough legal examination of this fait accompli,
focusing on any change in the pre-September 11 acquis concerning the law on self-defence.
This article starts by appraising the legal requirements of the right to self-defence in the
U.N. Charter and in customary international law with specific regard to an armed attack
requirement and the standard of evidence. Second, it seeks to delineate a coherent set of

DEREK W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
AND SELF-DEFENSE (3d ed. 2001);
THE USE OF FORCEBY STATES (1963); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION
CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (2000); HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OFTHE UNITED
NATIONS

-A

CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS

791-805, 913-926 (1951); Albrecht Ran-

delzhofer, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OFTHE UNITED NATIONS-A COMMENTARY, 112-136 (Bruno Simma
et al. ed., 2d ed. 2002); and Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620

(1984).
4. In the Nicaraguacase, in the areas of use of force and the right of self-defence, the ICJ held that:
... so far from having constituted a marked departure from a customary international law which still
exists unmodified, the Charter gave expression in this field to principles already present in customary
international law, and that law has in the subsequent four decades developed under the influence of
the Charter, to such an extent that a number of rules contained in the Charter have acquired a status
independent of it. The essential consideration is that both the Charter and the customary international
law flow from a common fundamental principle outlawing the use of force in international relations.
Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.U.S.), 1986 I.CJ.
14, at 96-97, para. 181 Oune 27).
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arguments on State responsibility assumed by the Taliban government, the breaches of
which reinforced the United States endeavour to broaden the claim of self-defence to include the attack against the State of Afghanistan itself. By analysing those issues, this article
aims to defend the thesis that despite the magnitude of political implications, the role of
international law is crucial in providing an expounded legal framework that can adequately
meet the challenge of international terrorist organisations. It concludes that insofar as concerns the military offensive against Afghanistan, international law has served to demarcate
the shifting (or stretching) boundaries of the right of self-defence. The adjustment of international law to the new political reality after the September 11 th attacks, unless this is
not stretched to any pre-emptive war against Iraq, has remained within the tight bounds of
the non-use of force principle, with limited disruptive effects on the acquis.
II. The Right of Self-Defence
A.

GENERAL OVERVIEW

Article 51 of the U.N. Charter recognizes the "inherent right" (or "droit naturel") of a
State to individual or collective self-defence in the event of an "armed attack." The right
of self-defence, together with enforcement action laid down in Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter, forms one of the two exceptions to the otherwise unconditional and peremptory
nature of the non-use of force principle, as recognised in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
The conditions on which the right of self-defence can be lawfully exercised have long
been contemplated in customary international law. Following the Carolineincident in 1837,
the then U.S. Secretary of State, Webster, defined thejus ad bellum principle of necessity
in his correspondence in 1842, demanding that prior to recourse to use of force, there must
be "a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation."' A caveat, however, must be noted. The Webster formula was a
product of the era in which resort to armed force was deemed as an acceptable attribute of
State sovereignty, 6 with the right of self-defence not clearly distinguished from the right of
self-preservation deriving from natural law.'
Whether pre-existing customary international law on the right of self-defence was superseded by, or subsumed into the U.N. Charter in 1945 was extensively analysed by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaraguacase. First, the Court stated that the
rules concerning non-use of force, non-intervention and the right of self-defence could be
found both in the U.N. Charter and in customary international law, and that the customary
international rules governing the same areas may not necessarily overlap the normative
content of the U.N. Charter.' Second, it was held that even if the customary norm and the
treaty norm were to have exactly the same content, this would not mean that incorporation
5. R. Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 89 (1938).
6. End oftse Cold War,supra note 3, at 126.
7. SojI YAMAMOTO, KOKUSAIHOU (PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW) (2001).

8. Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, at 94, para. 176 (June 27). After discussing that Article 51 does not refer to the well-established
customary principles of necessity and proportionality and that the Charter does not lay down the definition of

the "armed attack," the ICJ held:
It cannot therefore be held that Article 51 is a provision which "subsumes and supervenes" customary
international law. It rather demonstrates that in the field in question... customary international law
continues to exist alongside treaty law. The areas governed by the two sources of law thus do not
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of the customary norm into treaty law denies the former its separate applicability from the
latter. 9 Third, the ICJ held that the reporting obligation on a State invoking the right of
self-defence is so closely connected to the content of a treaty obligation that it cannot be
regarded as part of customary international law.'0
B. IssuEs

RELATING TO AN "ARMED ATTACK"

1. Meaning of an "ArmedAttack"

State practice till the adoption of the U.N. Charter did not furnish clear guidelines as to
what is meant by an "armed attack" within the meaning of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter."
Evidently, an "armed attack" constitutes a specific form of an act of "aggression," 2 which
falls within the broader category of "use of force." The definition of the term "aggression"
is extensively set forth in the unanimously adopted General Assembly Resolution on the
Definition ofAggression 1974.1

The ICJ in the Nicaragua case upheld the view that various acts as formulated in the
Definition of Aggression' 4 constitute customary international law."5 Furthermore, the Court
held that the prohibition of armed attacks in customary law covers not only the action by
regular armed forces across an international border, but also the sending of armed bands,
groups, irregulars or mercenaries to another country "on a significant scale."' 6 Yet, merely
furnishing weapons or other logistical support (including training) to the opposition in
another State was not held to constitute an "armed attack" in the sense of Article 51, albeit
such an act may be perceived as "a threat or use of force" in the sense of Article 2(4), or as
"intervention" in internal or external affairs of other States as proscribed in Article 2(7).'1
Further, financial aids to insurgents amount merely to an act of intervention but not to the
extent of the use of force." The Court's restrictive definition of an armed attack relative to
the "indirect use of force" was, however, criticised by Judge Jennings in his dissenting
opinion, who, representing the view shared by many western States, stated that "the
provision of arms may . . . be a very important element in what might be thought to
amount to armed attack, where it is coupled with other kinds of involvement.' 9 In a similar
vein, Kaikobad suggests that delict of assistance and interference be assimilated to that of
aggression/armed attack, provided that the level and effects of assistance and interference
are "neither insignificant nor wanting in sufficient gravity."20
overlap exactly, and the rules do not have the same content. This could also be demonstrated for other
subjects, in particular for the principle of non-intervention.
Nicaragua, 1986 I.CJ., at 94, para. 176.
9. Id. at 94-95, paras. 177-178.
10. Id. at 105, para. 200.
11. End of the Cold War, supra note 3, at 127.
12. Kelsen, supra note 3, at 797.
13. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc.A/RES/3314 (1975), Annex, Definition of Aggression.
14. Id. art. 3(g).
15. Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.CJ. 14, at 103-04, para. 195 (June 27).
16. Id.
17. Id.; see also id. IT 108, 116, 228.
18. Id. 9]228.
19. Id. at 543 (dissenting opinion of Judge Jennings).
20. Kaiyan. H. Kaikobad, Self-Defence, Enforcement Action and the Gulf Wars, 1980-88 and 1990-91,63 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 299, 313 (1993).
VOL. 36, NO. 4
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2. Dichotomy: Self-Defence in Response to an Armed Attack and ProportionateCountermeasures
against the Use of Force Short of an "ArmedAttack"?
The ICJ in the Nicaragua case appears to have introduced an element of relativity to the
notion of the use of force, stating that "it will be necessary to distinguish the most grave
forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms."2"
When assessing the conditions for lawful countermeasures, the Court observed that
a use of force of a lesser degree of gravity cannot... produce any entitlement to take collective
counter-measures involving the use of force. The acts of which Nicaragua is accused, even
assuming them to have been established and imputable to that State, could only have justified
proportionate counter-measures on the part of the State which had been the victim of these
acts, namely El Salvador, Honduras or Costa Rica. They could not justify counter-measures
taken by a third State, the United States, and particularly could not justify intervention involving the use of force.22
The ICJ's reasoning presupposes a bifurcated approach to the category of use of force:
on one hand, the existence of a grave form of the use of force that amounts to an "armed
attack," which enables the right of self-defence to be exercised; on the other, the existence
of a less serious form of the use of force, that is short of an "armed attack." Apart from the
provision of weapons, the latter instance encompasses the laying of mines in the territorial
and internal waters of another State, an unauthorised flight over another State's territory,"J
a minor frontier scuffle, and an attack against individual vessels or planes, neither of which
threatens the existence of a State as such.24
The Court has left the question equivocal as regards whether a State can invoke countermeasures involving use of force but not reaching the level of an armed attack. The ambiguous stance of the Court on this matter might be read as warranting the view that the latter
instance confers upon a victim State the right to take proportionate countermeasures,
though countermeasures are allowed individuallyonly and not collectively with the support
of other States.2" In the "Case concerning the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946"
(U.S. v. France), the Arbitral Tribunal stated:
If a situation arises which, in one State's view, results in the violation of an international
obligation by another State, the first State is entitled, within the limits set by the general
rules of international law pertaining to the use of armed force, to affirm its rights through
"counter-measures."2 6
The phrase "within the limits set by the general rules of international law pertaining to
the use of armed force" is ambivalent, suggesting that the award might tacitly recognise
the entitlement to invoke a counter-measure involving the use of force short of an armed
attack.27 However, the phrase at issue should be read as taking for granted the prohibition
of armed reprisals, the rule clearly established in customary international law. James

21. Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.U.S.),
1986 I.CJ. 14, at 96-97, para. 191 (June 27).
22. Id. 9 249, see also
id. 9 210-11.
23. Id. at 128, para. 251.
24. UNILATERAL USE OF FORCE, supra
note 3, at 223-27, 320-23.
25. Id. at 319-20.
26. Concerning Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 54 INTr'L L. REP. 303, 337.
27.

UNILATERAL

USE OF FORCE, supra
note 3, at 321-22.
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Crawford, the Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission (ILC), with respect
to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, notes that the use of the term "countermeasures" is confined to non-forcible part of reprisals.2" The discussion and reasoning followed
in this arbitration and the subsequent ICJ decisions 9 favour the latter construction.
3. Is an "ArmedAttack" an Indispensable Requirementfor the Right of Self-Defence?
There has been controversy as regards whether an "armed attack" is an essential precondition for a State to invoke the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter. Bowett avers that with the emphasis on the "inherent right" of self-defence, Article
51 is intended neither to impair the right of self-defence in pre-Charter customary international law nor to render its application dependent on conditions as laid down in this
provision.30 In contrast, Kelsen argues that the right of self-defence, at least for the
Members of the United Nations, "has no other content than the one determined by Article
51," suggesting a constitutive rather than declaratory effect of this provision.' According
to Kelsen's view, it would be difficult to sustain the right of anticipatory or pre-emptive
self-defence.
The travauxpriparatoiresof the Committee 111/4 at San Francisco, which drafted Article
51, warrant the view that the phrase in Article 51, "inherent rights" of self-defence, purported to provide regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States, 2
with the guarantee that their collective security arrangements would not be prejudiced by
the Security Council's enforcement action.33 This lends support to the separate and continued operation of the right of self-defence in customary law, unbridled by the "armed
attack" requirement. Nevertheless, when assessing the content of a customary law right of
self-defence, greater significance must be attached to the development of State practice
since 1945, which evidently differs from "a totally unreconstructed pre-1945 right of selfdefence."3 4 Evolution of State practice and opiniojurissuggests the interlocking relationship
between Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and customary international law in the area of selfdefence. In the Nicaraguacase, the ICJ confirmed "under international law in force todaywhether customary internationallaw or that of the United Nationssystem-States do not have a
right of 'collective' armed response to acts which do not constitute an 'armed attack.""'
This dictum can be construed afortiorias presupposing the same terms on which the right
of individual self-defence is to be performed, as the right of collective self-defence hinges
on the former right. Since this judgment was made in 1986, no conclusive evidence can be

28.

JAMES

R.

CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY-

INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES

281, 283 (2002).

29. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, at 27, para. 53
(May 24); Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.CJ. 14, at 102, para. 201 (une 27); Gabtfkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.CJ. 7, at
55, paras. 82-87 (Sept. 25).
30. Bowett, upra note 3, at 185.
31. Kelsen, supra
note 3, at 913-14. He does not favour the "natural law doctrine," according to which
Article 51of the U.N. Charter is merely declaratory of customary international law. Id. at 792.
32. See the discussion on the compatibility of the draft Article 51 with the Act of Chapultepec 1945 of the
Inter-American Conference. Bowett, supra
note 3, at 182-83.
33. Id. at 182-87.

34. D.J.

HARRIS, CASESAND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW

896-97 (5th ed. 1998).

35. Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.CJ. 14, at 110, para. 211 (June 27).
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adduced that State practice and opiniojurishave been altered in such a manner as to negate
the requirement of an armed attack.
4. Protagonistof an Armed Attack
While Article 51 is silent on the question by which an armed attack must be carried out
to call Article 51 into play, it is abundandy clear from State practice since the Charter, that
States invoking self-defence have envisioned an armed attack by another State, and not an
attack by non-State actors such as terrorist organizations.16 It has never been envisioned in
thejus ad bellum context that non-State actors, especially those not viewed as part of combatants (such as a global terrorist organisation), would be equated to a State capable of
launching an "armed attack" in the sense of Article 51. Article I of the 1974 "Definition of
Aggression"37 states that aggression needs to stem from a State. 8 In those circumstances,
it is not surprising that a caution has been voiced as to the inclusion of terrorist acts within
the ambit of "armed attacks."3 9
Up until the September 11th attacks, the implicit presumption that only a State is the
author of an armed attack underlay Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which laid the
foundation for the Western collective self-defence system in the post-WWII trans-Atlantic
order. The "Alliance's Strategic Concept," adopted by the North Atlantic Council on April
24, 1999, mentioned that armed attacks on the territory of the Member States "from whatever direction" was covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Yet terrorism,
just as sabotage and organised crime, was described only as a form of "other risks of a wider
nature" in its paragraph 24.40
C. THE

RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE AND THE REPORTING

DuTy

1. General Overview
Significant qualification of the "inherent right" of self-defence may arise from the competing relationship between this right and the enforcement action of the Security Council.
Article 51 provides that the right of self-defence can be kept intact "until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security," the
condition echoed in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The textual reading of those
provisions suggests that once the Security Council employs measures necessary to restore
peace, the competence of a victim State to interpret the term "armed attack" and to evaluate
the occurrence of an armed attack in a concrete case should be transferred to this organ,

36. Schrijver, supra note 1, at 284.
37. G.A. Res. 3314, GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 19, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974).
38. Id. art. 1. This provision reads:
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United
Nations, as set out in this Definition." This provision is accompanied by an Explanatory note, which
States that '(i)n this Definition the term "State" . . . [i]s used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a State is a member of the United Nations...'
39. Giorgio Gaja, In What Sense was There an 'Armed Attack'? at http://www.ejil.org/forumWTC/

index.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
40. U.S. Dep't of State, NATO Alliance Strategic Concept, approved by the Heads of States and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Washington D.C., Apr. 24, 1999, available
at http://www.State.gov/www/regions/eur/nato/nato-990424_stratcncpt.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2002).
WINTER 2002
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with the consequence that self-defence action pursuant to Article 51 should remain "provisional." 4' Article 51 of the Charter also entails two implications that can place constraints
on the exercise of self-defence: first, the questions of the burden and standard of proof; and
second, the duration of the self-defence action.
2. The Burden of Proofand the Evidentiary Standard
The reporting duty poses questions of whether a victim State is required to bear the
burden to prove the necessity of self-defence, (the occurrence of use of force constituting
an armed attack), and, if so, what standard of evidence should be considered adequate. It is
possible to contemplate that the requirement of necessity, as established in general international law since the 1842 Webster formula relative to the Caroline incident in 1837, has
been consolidated into the reporting duty under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The stringent requirement implied by the text of Article 51 upholds the view that even in an ongoing conflict or campaign, as opposed to a one-off incident, a State should report each
episode separately and discharge the "burden" to prove that the claim of self-defence is
justified on the ground of necessity and proportionality.4 This means that a State invoking
self-defence needs to substantiate the existence of an armed attack imputable to a specific
State, and that its defensive action must comply with the proportionate test. In contrast, it
is not widely accepted that there has been an ascertainable degree of usus, supported by
opiniojuris,as regards the standard of evidence. The dearth of discussion is striking on this
matter, and State practice since 1945 does not furnish much guideline.
A series of instances in which States resorted to unilateral use of force amply demonstrates
the inchoate and ambiguous nature surrounding the discussions on the reporting duty and
especially on the evidentiary standard. The absence of clear guideline on issues of evidence
can be well illustrated, not least in relation to the tendency of the U.S. to exercise broad
defensive action based on thin evidence. The policy of the successive U.S. administrations
gradually discarded the notion of the necessity of proof, reserving an ample scope of discretion to employ unilateral measures under the banner of self-defence. This proclivity was
illustrated in the Clinton administration's decisions to launch missiles against the Iraqi
Intelligence Headquarters in Baghdad in 1993, to hit bin Laden's terrorist bases in Afghanistan, and to attack a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan in 1998. 41 There is criticism that
those U.S. military strikes were premised on mere inference and not subjected to international supervision, straining the delicate balance between the general principle of non-use
of force in Article 2(4) and its exceptional rule in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.- With
specific regard to the attack against the Sudanese pharmaceutical plant, the credibility of
the U.S. administration was questioned by its effort to block Sudan's request for a Security
4
Council resolution calling for a fact-finding mission.
41. Kelsen, supra note 3, at 800.
42. Gray notes that this seems to be the accepted practice of many States, as demonstrated in the Iran-Iraq
war, the Falkland/Malvinas conflict, and the U.S. involvement in the escort operation in the Gulf during the
Iran-Iraq war. Gray, supra note 3, at 91-92.
43. While the United States successfully blocked a Security Council resolution condemning the U.S. raid
on Libya, the General Assembly condemned it. Jules Lobel, The Use ofForce to Respond to TerroristAttacks: The
Bombing of Sudan andAfgbanistan, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 537, 538 (1999); see also Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to
Terrorism: The Strikes againstbin Laden, 24 YALEJ. INT'L L. 559, 576 (1999).
44. Lobel, supra note 43, at 547.
45. Steven Lee Myers, After the Attacks: The Overview, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 25, 1998, at Al; see also Lobel,
supra note 43, at 546, 550.
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3. Time Limit on Self-Defence
The reporting duty signifies that there may be a time limit on the exercise of self-defence.
The temporal span of the right of self-defence seems to end at the point when the Security
Council, acting under Chapter VII, assumes the "primary responsibility" to restore peace
and security. The constraint on the right of self-defence is reinforced by the provisos that
any measure adopted in the exercise of the right of self-defence must be immediately reported to the Security Council and that they must not affect the authority and responsibility
of the Council. The perceived time limit on the entitlement to self-defence is underpinned
by the embedded belief of the framers of the Charter that with the Security Council endowed with the primary (albeit not exclusive) responsibility in maintaining international
peace and security, even unilateral military action pursuant to self-defence, should be subordinated to the multilateral mechanism established under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
Action pursued in the course of self-defence must normally be an immediate response to
an attack. An undue time lag may raise doubt as to compliance with the requirements of
necessity and proportionality.46 The requirement of an immediate response is not literally
immediate action, but the immediate invocation of the right of self-defence and the resultant
deliberations on implementing measures. 47 Moreover, a victim State can retain the right to
have recourse to the first strike pursuant to self-defence, insofar as an unlawful situation
created by an armed attack remains unchanged, despite the good-faith effort by a victim
State to pursue peaceful means to solve the disputes.4* These points were confirmed by the
Bush administration's approximately one-month assessment of necessary measures to respond to the September 11 th attacks.
However, a mere glance at Article 51 makes it abundantly clear that in case forcible
actions are necessary for a lengthy period, it is the Security Council that must take over
the responsibility of enforcement action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The
Security Council is endowed with the power to appraise necessary action, including steps
to identify delinquent States, against which forcible action should be directed, and to determine the means and methods for enforcement actions, as well as the duration of any
coercive operation. 49 There is also a non-obstruction duty on the Member States, with their
defensive measures enjoined not to affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council. It remains unclear under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter whether the Charter
confers upon a victim State the power to determine the adequacy of necessary measures
that the Security Council has employed to restore peace. Writing in 1951, Kelsen noted
that the intention of the drafters was inconclusive, though militating in favour of the competence of the Security Council so to do. 0 Yet, evidently the failure of the Security Council
to determine existence of an "act of aggression" or the other two situations ("threat to the
peace" and "breach of peace") within the meaning of Article 39 of the U.N. Charter does
not require a victim State to cease exercising the right of self-defence. The exercise of the
right under Article 51 is not conditional on the decisions of the Council.s" Nor does the
right of self-defence have to be overridden whenever the Security Council adopts measures

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Cassese, supra note 1, at 997-98.
End of the Cold War,supra note 3, at 227.
Id.
Kelsen, supra note 3, at 802-03.
Id. at 803.
Id. at 803-05.
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considered necessary in case of an armed attack. 2 There also remains a scope of argument
that insofar as a defensive measure by a victim State does not thwart the effectiveness of
the Security Council's enforcement action, its concurrent and continued exercise remains
lawful. This seems to be the implicit, albeit not the express and primary legal ground for
the U.S. continued operation in Afghanistan.
III. The September 11 Attacks and the Ius ad Bellum
Appraisal of the Use of Force
A.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

1368 & 1373

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1368, which was adopted unanimously on the day
following the September 11 th attacks, recognized the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence" in its preamble. It also refers to its "readiness to take all necessary steps
to respond" to the attacks, and "to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its
responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations."
Preliminary observations can be made as regards Resolution 1368. First, reference to the
recognition of "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence" is found in its
preamble, with its operative part not expressly recognising the right of the victim State,
namely the United States, to use force as a form of self-defence.5 3 Second, there is no
reference to a target country against which self-defence can be directed.5 4 Third, while
defining the terrorist attacks as a "threat to international peace and security," Resolution
1368 is silent on whether the Security Council is acting specifically under Article 39 or
under Chapter VII in general."5 This means that the phrase "all necessary steps," contrary
to the similar phrase used in Chapter VII-based Resolution 678 of November 1990 during
the Gulf crisis, may not furnish a basis for authorising what is euphemistically called Article
42 military action.16 In none of the Security Council resolutions adopted in response to
terrorism, has authorisation yet been given for enforcement action involving use of force,
with the anti-terrorism measures confined to the sanction regime under Article 41 of the
U.N. Charter. Be that as it may, the three preliminary issues are not of material nature,
since the United States and its allies relied on Resolution 1373, a Chapter VII-based mandatory resolution, and on the "inherent right of individual and collective self-defence" as
stipulated in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. It will be subsequently examined whether both
Article 51 and customary international law have adjusted the armed attack requirement to
the immediate political needs, allowing the source of an armed attack to be extended to
cover non-State actors.

52. Compare Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM J. INT'L L. 452, 458 (1991)
(adding that "the Council has the authority to adopt a measure that would require armed action to cease even
if that action was undertaken in self-defence," but that such a measure would not necessarily "preempt" selfdefence), with Dinstein, spra note 3, at 189 (theorizing that only a legally binding decision, rather than a
recommendation, adopted by the Security Council will engender the "imperative" effect of terminating defensive action).
53. U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. SC/7143 (2001).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Condorelli, supra note 1, at 837.
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Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001, another unanimous resolution, expressly mentions that this was adopted by the Security Council "acting under Chapter VII of the United
Nations."57 In its preambular paragraph, Resolution 1373 reaffirmed a primarily negative
duty set out in the General Assembly's Friendly Relations Resolution (1970) and in Security
Council Resolution 1189 (1998), emphasising that States should "refrain from organizing,
instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in
organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts." 8 In
its operative paragraphs, Resolution 1373 elaborated upon the numerous anti-terrorism
obligations of both positive and negative nature, which were set forth in Resolution 1269
(1999).s 9 First, there exist positive duties to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist
acts, including the freezing of funds and financial assets of those involved in terrorist acts. 60
Second, States are obliged to refrain from providing any support, active or passive, to those
engaged in terrorism and to take steps to prevent terrorist acts through early warning and
other means. Third, positive obligations go in tandem with the renewed emphasis on the
need to penalise acts of international terrorism, with the States bound to ensure that national criminal law defines terrorism as "serious criminal offences" and that any individual
taking part in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorism must be
brought to justice pursuant to national criminal law. States are also enjoined to deny safe
havens to those involved in terrorist acts and to prevent their territories from being used
for terrorist purposes. 61 Further, Resolution 1373 tapped internal machinery designed to
counter international terrorism. Activating the Committee of the Security Council in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, it called on the Committee to
supervise national implementation of anti-terrorism measures on the basis of a reporting
system. 62 Condorelli observes that "laResolution 1373 ne s'occupe nullement d'un cas ou
d'une situation d&ermin~s ... mais lfgifere justement en mati~re de terrorisme international en g~nral, en consacrant des obligations lourdes, pr~vues comme applicables sans
aucune limite temporelle et spatiale. . ."I' Such an extraordinary nature of Resolution 1373
allows it to be virtually equated to a universal treaty, corroborating the view that the Security
Council's mandatory resolutions can shape "secondary legislation" of international law.The comprehensive nature of a resolution would raise the question whether the Member
States of the U.N. have, 6 through Article 24 of the Charter, delegated enforcement power
66
to the Security Council to enact a resolution of such a wide-ranging scope.
57. U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., at 2-3, U.N. Doc. SC/7158 (2001).
58. Id.
19.
59. U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES1269 (1999).
60. Id. 1.
61. Id. 2.
62. Id. 6.

63. Condorelli, supra
note 1,at 834.
64. See G. Arangio-Ruiz, On the
Security
Council's
Law-Making,83 RIvIsTA 01 DIRrrTo
(2000).
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609

65. The present writer considers that it is the Member States acting collectively through the Charter that
have delegated enforcement power to the Security Council. R. Degni-Segui, Fonctions
etpouvoirs-Article 24,

inLA CHARTE DES NATIONS

UNIES

450 0. P. Cot &A. Pellet eds. 1991); see
also
DANESH

NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY-THE DELEGATION BY THE
OF ITS CHAPTER

SAROOSHI, THE UNITED

UN SECURITY

COUNCIL

VII POWERS 26-32 (1999).

66. Condorelli, supra note 1, at 835.

WINTER 2002

1092

B.

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

HAvE THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

1368

AND

1373

AUTHORISED THE RIGHT

OF SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST AFGHANISTAN?

1. Determinationof the Threat to the Peace
Although recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in their
preambles, Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 qualified the September 1 th attacks as a "threat to the peace," rather than as an act of "aggression," which includes an
"armed attack" within the meaning of Article 51.61 This seems contradictory, yet it is consistent with all the Chapter VII resolutions relating to acts of international terrorism, which
6s
entail the findings of a "threat to the peace" or its equivalent situation.
It is possible that the hesitancy to determine "aggression" stems from the difficulty with
defining the aggression and its component, "armed attack." It suffices to remember the illfated efforts of the International Law Commission to define the concept of "aggression" in
the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind 69 and in the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Preparatory Commission of the
Rome conference in 1998 failed to muster consensus on the definition of the crime of
aggression, the progeny of the crime against peace, postponing the task of providing its
adequate definition to the Review Conference that will be held in 2009.70 Even the "Definition of Aggression" resolution failed to furnish a comprehensive understanding of aggression that was free from controversy. There exists a strong perception, as shared by
Judge Schwebel in his dissenting opinion in the Nicaraguacase, that determination of aggression is not a legal ascertainment but merely a political consideration.7' The similarly
reluctant attitude was observed when the Security Council described the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait as "a breach of the peace" in its Resolution 660 in 1990.72 Cassese offers another
plausible reason for hesitancy to determine "aggression," noting that the Council was "wavering between the desire to take matters into its own hands and resignation to unilateral
73
action by the U.S."
2. Severance of an Armed Attack from a State Apparatus?
A more intractable question is whether Resolutions 1368 and 1373 allow Article 51 to
be interpreted as justifying self-defence in response to an armed attack carried out by
67. Id.; see also Cassese, supra note 1, at 996.
68. Apart from the resolutions relative to Afghanistan cited in the text, see Resolution 731 of 21 January
1992 and Chapter VII-based Resolution 748 of 31 March 1992 (both relating to Libya's alleged implications
in the attacks against the Pan-Am aircraft over Lockerbie and against the UTA aircraft); and two Chapter VIIbased resolutions, Resolution 1054 of 26 April 1996 and Resolution 1070 of 16 August 1996 (both regarding
non-compliance by Sudan with the requests of the Organization of African Unity to extradite to Ethiopia for
prosecution purposes the suspects of the assassination, and with the duty to desist from supporting, aiding and
abetting terrorism).
69. The ILC left the definitional effort at abeyance, with Article 16 of the Draft Code merely stating that
"[a]n individual who, as leader or organizer, actively participates in or orders the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of aggression committed by a State shall be responsible for a crime of aggression." The
International Law Commission's Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, available
at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dcodefra.htm.
70. While Article 5 of the Rome Statute includes the crime of aggression within the jurisdiction ratione
materiae of the ICC, the task of defining it is, by virtue of Articles 5(2), 121, and 123, left to the Review
Conference that will take place in 2009.
71. Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.CJ. 14, at 290 (June 27).
72. U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/0660 (1990).
73. Cassese, sipra note 1, at 996.
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non-State actors. The right of self-defence has always been envisaged against an armed
attack from a State. Any attempt to expand the scope of the right of self-defence by adding
non-State actors to the instigator of an armed attack must be treated with caution, as the
exceptions to the non-use of force principle must be construed strictly in light of the paramount value of peace as embedded in the constitutional paradigm of the post-WWII
international society.
One way of overcoming the interpretative difficulty of an "armed attack" requirement
would be to uphold evolutive interpretation of a conventional rule,14 the method of interpretation fully recognised in the jurisprudence of international tribunals.,' Symbolically for
the first time in its history, NATO invoked Article 5 of the 1949 Washington Treaty, characterising the attacks on the United States as those against all the other Member States.16
Though NATO did not, in its press releases, make any reference to Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, the United States and the United Kingdom duly reported to the Security Council
when initiating military operations against Afghanistan pursuant to the right of individual
and collective self-defence." 7 It should also be noted that when the fifty-six States met in
Qatar on October 10, 2001 at the conference of the Organisation for the Islamic Conference, they did not criticise the U.S. and U.K. military assaults on Afghanistan, limiting
their opposition only to any attempt to extend military operations beyond Afghanistan."
There is an argument that the practice of the States represented in the Security Council
and of Member States of NATO, as well as other States in the General Assembly 79 that have
not objected to such a move, could be taken as assimilating an attack by a terrorist organisation
to an armed aggression by a State, enabling an injured State to invoke individual self-defence
and to request third States to act in collective self-defence under Article 51. 80
Examining the possibility of "instant custom" also provides legal explanations to this
sudden change in the constituent elements required for the right of self-defence. As
M

74. Condorelli, supranote 1, at 837; see also Schrijver,supranote 1, at 285. While not examining the possibility
of instant custom, Schrijver applies this interpretation to consider the change in an armed attack requirement;
see also Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations CharterAs Constitution ofThe InternationalCommunity, 36 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529, 594 (1998) (providing analysis of interpretation based on "a living instrument" relative
to the U.N. Charter).
75. See Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa), 1971 I.CJ. 53 (21 June 1971). This method has been well established in the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: YUTAKA AIRAI-TKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OFAPPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR 197-204
(2002); Paul Mahoney, JudicialActivism andJfudicial Self-Restraint in the European Court ofHuman Rights: Two
Sides of the Same Coin, 11 HUM. RTs. L.J. 57 (1990); JOXERRAMON BENGOETXEA, THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OFJUSTICE: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN
JURISPRUDENCE 251-62 (1993) (providing the approach of
the European Court of Justice).
76. Press Release, NATO, September 11-One Year On (Sept. 12, 2002), available at http://www.nato.int/
terorism (last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
77. U.N. Docs. S/2001/946 and S/2001/947, 7 October 2001, referred to in Schrijver, supra note 1, at 283.
78. Keesings Record of World Events, supra note 2, at 44393.
79. In this context, see the General Assembly Resolution 56/1 of 12 September 2001. This resolution called
for international cooperation "to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the outrages of
11 September 2001" and "to prevent and eradicate acts of terrorism," and stated that those aiding, supporting
or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of such acts would also be held accountable. G.A. Res.
56, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 1st plen. mtg.,
3-4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/1, available at http://www.un.org/
documents/ga/res/56/a56r001.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
80. Cassese, supra note 1, at 996-97; see also Condorelli, supra note 1, at 840.
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formulated in Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court ofJustice, deviations
from the treaty-based principles can be treated as furnishing "evidence of a general practice
accepted as law." Moreover, whether or not such a general practice has accompanied opinio
juris and led to the formation of a new customary norm, "any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty" "shall be taken into account" when interpreting the meaning of
a treaty rule."' The question needs to be addressed as to whether, and if so, to what extent
both the objective element of consistent State practice and the subjective element of opinio
jurissivenecessitatiss2 can be identified in favour of altering the normative scope and element
of the right of self-defence in general international law.
In the North Sea ContinentalShelf cases, the ICJ suggested the possibility of instant custom, stating that the passage of only a short period of time is not an indispensable condition
for the formation of a new customary rule from a conventional provision of norm-creating
character. The ICJ emphasised the conditions for such possibility, noting that State practice,
as discerned in "a very widespread and representative participation in a convention" including that of "States whose interests [are) specially affected," must be both "extensive and
virtually uniform" (friquente etpratiquementuniforme) and indicative of a general recognition
that a legal obligation is involved." While the ICJ's discussion on instant custom is limited
to the capacity of a treaty provision incorporating new meaning and substance to generate
a corresponding customary rule, the formation of an instant customary rule without the
existence of such a provision is not ipsofacto excluded, provided that certain conditions set
out by the ICJ are met.s4 This means that reading a new form of an armed attack requirement into Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, a multilateral treaty provision considered declaratory of customary law, is not prevented from having the effect of instantaneously producing a corresponding customary rule. In regard to the requirement of "extensiveness"
and "uniformity" of State practice, there appears to be a slight difference in nuance between
the two authentic languages, as the word "friquente"in French connotes an element of time
span, a rather contradictory condition for instant custom. 5 The statements and conduct of
the States represented in the Security Council and the General Assembly since the September 11 th attacks amply support that this requirement, at least in the English text, has been
fulfilled to favour the new meaning injected into an armed attack in customary law. Further,
the fact that the formation of instant custom appeals especially to highly malleable areas
susceptible to rapid technological development, as in the case of space law and continental
shelf, 6 does not foreclose such eventuality in other areas.8 7 Even if one does not countenance the theory of instant custom as such, the acquiescence by the international

81. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(3)(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
82. North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 1969 ICJ REP 3, 44 (Judgment of 20 February, 1969).
83. Id.at 42-43, paras. 73-74.
84. Contra P. DAILLIER &A. PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 324-25 (6th ed. 1999).
85. From this Dailler and Pellet deduce the conclusion that there is no room for instant custom. They
note that:
Sur le fond, les exigences classiques sont respectdes: pr~f6rer le terme ((frlquence)) a celui de ((constance)) ou ((continuit6)) revient simplement a tenir compte du caract~re al~atoire et irr~gulier des
occasions concretes offertes aux ltats d'adopter un certain comportement sur un sujet donn6... La
notion de ((coutume instantande)) ou ((immdiate)) doit donc &re rejetle.
Id. at 325.
86.

IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

87. Id.; accordMALCOLM
VOL. 36, NO. 4

SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW

5 (5th ed.1998).

62 (4th ed. 1997).
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community as a whole in the U.S. and its allied action demonstrates that at the time of the
initiation of hostilities (7 October 2001), the rubric of self-defence lexferenda was emerging
that would refashion the armed attack requirement so as to adequately respond to the
danger posed by a global terrorist network.
The fact that the Bush administration initiated the military offensive against Afghanistan
in October 2001 on the premise both of Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 and
of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, without invoking the customary law right of self-defence,
means that the analysis of instant custom remains purely academic exercise. While displaying a willingness to act within the U.N.-based multilateral legal framework, a politically
salutary move, the U.S. administration has succeeded in allowing the extended form of
the right of self-defense to be read into Article 51 to include action in response to an
armed attack by non-State actors. It is submitted that such dynamic interpretation has given
rise to, and has been complemented by, the concurrent formation of a new customary rule
of self-defense, whose path of development closely follows that of Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter.
3. The Reporting Obligation and the Standard of Evidence
Provided that any obstacles relating to the author of an armed attack are overcome in
favour of a new mode of the right of self-defence, the remaining question is whether the
United States and its allied forces lawfully exercised the right of self-defence. This question
must be addressed through examining the reporting duty on the State invoking the right
of self-defence and the closely associated issue, the standard of evidence.
It may be argued that in order to avoid a State's abusive recourse to unilateral military
action, any defensive action must be carried out only subsequent to the establishment of no
less than sufficient evidence before the Security Council. Such an argument favours a
stringent regime of use of force, attaching to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter an evidentiary
presumption that recourse to self-defence should be grounded on facts that are "clear and
unambiguous.""s Against such a line of argument, there is a view that it is simply unrealistic,
in an age of high-tech weaponry, to expect a victim State to stay idle and wait for another
imminent and devastating blow, while attempting to obtain sufficient evidence. There is
also a reasonable fear that disclosure of highly sensitive intelligence information might
undermine the operational effectiveness of defence action against an enemy as determined
s9
and efficient as a global terrorist network. In those circumstances, a reporting obligation should be deemed as satisfied by immediate notification to the Security Council of
the measures employed and of the tactics contemplated to pursue the defensive aims.
Nonetheless, in regard to the standard of evidence, the necessity principle as fully anchored
in customary international law may be progressively construed to require a stringent
°
standard of evidence to be garnered, ranging from "clear and convincing" evidence to
"compelling evidence." 9'

88. Lobel, supra note 43, at 547.
89. Wedgwood, supra note 43, at 567-68.
90. Lobel, supra note 43, at 551 (suggesting that a government should at least possess "reasonable certainty
and direct evidence of wrongdoing").
91. Cassese, supra note 1, at 1000 (emphasizing the need to garner the "compelling evidence" to demonstrate
that States are harbouring, tolerating or even fostering terrorist organizations in breach of the duties emanating
from the Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII).
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In order to justify the joint U.S. and U.K. military assault against the Taliban and al
Qaeda network in Afghanistan, there must exist evidence that al Qaeda members had
planned and executed the attacks on September 11. On October 2, 2001, the NATO formally announced that it had received, along with U.N. officials, "clear and compelling"
evidence from the United States that proved bin Laden's culpability. 92 Two days later, the
U.K. government released a twenty-one-page document that entailed, in its view, the "clear
conclusion" confirming the implication of the al Qaeda network in executing the September
1 th attacks. 9
4. State Responsibility of the Taliban Government
a. Attribution of the September 11 Attacks to the Taliban
It must be questioned whether the September 11th attacks, the internationally wrongful
acts, were imputable to the Taliban government in Kabul under general international law
relative to State responsibility. This question should be addressed through the close appraisal of the ILC's Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 94 which largely codifies customary
international law. With respect to the question whether the September 11th attacks can be
imputed to the Taliban regime in Kabul, it must first be noted that general international
law on State responsibility seems neutral on the question of form of fault (wrongful intent,
lack of due diligence and other mens rea) making the question largely dependent on primary
rules, breach of which would give rise to international responsibility. 91 This general statement does not, however, purport to negate the underlying principles that international
delinquency is "essentially delictual and based on fault, requiring either intentional or negligent conduct on the part of the State," and that "strict or objective" . . . responsibility,
with "conduct and result alone establishing the breach of an obligation," is a limited possibility.96 In the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ ruled that all the States owed an "obligation
not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
States." 97 While rejecting the view that the mere control over the territory and waters would
mean that Albania "necessarily knew" or "ought to have known" unlawful acts therein, the
court presumed Albania's knowledge based on indirect evidence such as inferences of fact
and circumstantial evidence, finding her responsibility for the explosion of the vessels in
Albanian waters. 9 In the context of the September 11th attacks, the fact that al Qaeda was
operative on its soil does not necessarily presuppose the Taliban's knowledge of the attacks,
even drawing on the notion of culpa.90 Yet, it is arguable that without introducing the theory
92. Condorelli, supra note 1, at 837. The U.S. representative at the Security Council made a statement that
"[iln response to these attacks, and in accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective selfdefence, United States armed forces have initiated actions designed to prevent and deter further attacks on the
United States"; see also Keesing's Record of World Events, supra note 2, at 44393 (indicating that on 4 October
2001, the government of Pakistan, ruled by the military dictator, Gen. Musharraf, announced that in its view
the U.S. provided sufficiently strong evidence to indict bin Laden in a court of law).
93. The U.K. Prime Minister, Tony Blair, also stated in the House of Commons that bin Laden had warned
his associates before September 11 of an imminent major operation in the United States and told them to
return to Afghanistan. Keesing's Record of World Events, supra note 2, at 44393; see also Blair Presentshis Case
AgainstAl-QaidaNetwork, INDEP., Oct. 5, 2001, at 4.
94. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 56, U.N. Doc.
A/36/10 (2001).
95. Crawford, supra note 28, at 12-14.
(R. Jennings & A. Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996).
96. L. F.OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. 1: PEACe
97. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.CJ. 4, at 22 (Apr. 9).
98. Id. at 18.
VOL. 36, NO. 4

SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE

1097

of absolute responsibility, the Taliban's knowledge could be remotely inferred on the basis
of the notion of culpa in the particular circumstances, where obligations had been imposed
on the Taliban by a series of the Security Council resolutions to take steps to prevent and
punish international terrorism.
Al Qaeda, which is not an "insurrectional or other movement" within the meaning of
Article 10 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, but a private group not entertaining
legal personality,'-s cannot be regarded as a defacto "organ of a State" as provided in Article
4 of the Draft Articles. It was neither instructed, directed, nor controlled by a State in the
0
sense of Article 8 of the Draft Articles.' ' In the Nicaragua case, the Court emphasised that
in order to establish attribution of acts of private persons to a State, the latter must exercise
"effective control" over the acts, 02 suggesting that "a general situation of dependence and
1
support" alone would not suffice. 0 While the Appeals Chamber of the International Crimin the Tadic case lowered the requisite degree of
former
Yugoslavia
for
the
inal Tribunal
0 4
control to the "overall control" test to find the armed conflict to be international,' this
case dealt with different issues, viz., the applicability of humanitarian law and individual
00
criminal responsibility. At any rate, it is hard to recognise that the Taliban held "effective
control" over the specific conduct of al Qaeda on September 11, 2001.106 Further, al Qaeda
could not be considered as exercising "elements of the governmental authority" within the
10 7
meaning of Article 9 of the Draft Articles, albeit arguably the partial territorial control
by the Taliban government meant that the terms "in the absence or default of the official
authorities" were met.
The perusal must turn to another possibility, conduct of private actors acknowledged and
adopted by a State as its own. Article 11 of the "Draft Articles on State Responsibility"

99. While the Taliban leader Mullah Omar did not give express endorsement to the September 11 th attacks,
it justified the consistent refusal to expel bin Laden; Mullah Omar-in his own words, GUARDIAN, Sept. 26,2001,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,3604,558076,00.htmnl(last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
100. The fact that al Qaeda did not possess legal personality does not foreclose the applicability of Article
8 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, as it expressly refers to "group of persons."
101. This provision reads that "[tlhe conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of
a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or
under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct." The International Law Commission's
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 8, available at http://
www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/State responsibility/responsibilityfra.htm.
102. Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.CJ. 14, at 62, 64-65, paras. 109 & 115 (June 27).
103. Crawford, supra note 28, at 111.
104. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Case IT-94-1-A, Prosecutorv.
Tadid, paras. 117 and 145.
105. See also Cyprus v. Turkey, where the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Turkey's "effective
overall control" over northern Cyprus meant that her "acquiescence or connivance" in the acts of private individuals infringing others' rights secured in the European Convention on Human Rights might give rise to her
state responsibility under the Convention. App. No. 25781/94, paras. 77 & 81 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 10, 2001).
106. Id. Clearly, the instructions, direction or control must be related to the conduct that would constitute
an internationally wrongful act.
107. This provision reads that "[t]he conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of
a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the
exercise of those elements of authority." The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 9, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/
State-responsibility/responsibilityfra.htm.
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provides that "[c]onduct which is not attributable to a State ...shall nevertheless be considered an act of that State under international law if and to the extent that the State
acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own." The terms, "acknowledgement" and "adoption," are used to distinguish from cases of "mere support or endorsement." The effects of a State's official approval of the conduct of private actors are generally
prospective, 08 albeit retroactive effects can be recognised in cases where not mere congratulations °9 but "unequivocal and unqualified" acknowledgement and adoption are
made." 0 The stronger word "adoption," goes beyond a general acknowledgement of an
event and implies that "the conduct is acknowledged by the State as, in effect, its own
conduct.""' The Taliban's obstinate refusal to cooperate with the Security Council, including its opposition to the expulsion of bin Laden, could be approximated to "acknowledgement and adoption" though not of "unequivocal and uiqualified" nature.
All these examinations of the rules on attribution in customary international law on State
responsibility suggest that it is difficult and only faintly possible to consider the September
11th attacks per se to be the act of the Taliban government and that the Taliban's more
evident responsibility should be found elsewhere. Absent a general and comprehensive
treaty, the primary rules governing acts of international terrorism such as the September
11th attacks are limited to a set of customary international law principles that have been
generated by the consistent and uniform State practice through the Security Council's
Chapter VII-based resolutions and the General Assembly's Friendly Relations Resolution
2625. Closer appraisal of those resolutions needs to be made to establish any breach of
obligations engaged by the Taliban government, which serves to strengthen a claimed right
to strike the Taliban. In order to gain closer insight into the nature of obligations entailed
by the Taliban, the next examination must deal with the question of responsibility stemming
from the obligation to prevent and punish terrorism in general international law, as consistently affirmed by resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly. The
focus of analysis then shifts to the related issue of indirect aggression, without introducing
the notion of indirect responsibility.
b. Counter-Terrorism Duties Emanating from the Resolutions of the Security Council
and of the General Assembly
The Friendly Relations Resolution 2625 of the General Assembly furnishes elaborate
meaning of the principle of non-use of force in relation to terrorism, stating that "[elvery
State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in...
terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory

108. In the Diplomatic and Consular Staff case, the Court held that once the Government of Iran approved
the militants' seizure of the embassy and detention of the U.S. personnel, their illegal acts became its own.
While the government's endorsement was given the prospective effect, the responsibility for private conduct
in the earlier period was assumed through its failure to take necessary action to prevent and halt the illegal act.
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 ICJ REP 3, 31-33, paras. 63-68 Judgment
of 24 May 1980).
109. Id. at 29-30, para. 59. In the Diplomatic and Consular Staff case, the Court stated that "congratulations
after the event... and other subsequent statements of official approval... do not alter the initially independent
and unofficial character of the militants' attack on Embassy," negating the attribution of private conduct to
a State.
110. Crawford, supra note 28, at 122; seealso
Lighthouse Arbitration, R.I.A.A., vol. XII, p. 155 (1956), at
pp. 197-98.
111.
Crawford, supra note 28, at 123.
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directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts ... involve a threat or use of
2
force."" This primarily negative duty on the States is supplemented by the principle of
non-interference in domestic affairs of another State, which, according to Resolution 262 5,
encompasses the obligation of the States to refrain from organising, assisting, fomenting,
financing, inciting or tolerating terrorist activities. Yet, the application of the latter principle
is circumscribed only to the situation where perceived aims of terrorist acts are directed
towards either the "violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interference in
3
civil strife in another State."" While the Friendly Relations Resolution, as a form of General Assembly resolution, is not, st-icto sensu, legally binding, it is regarded as authoritative
interpretation of the fundamental principles of the U.N. Charter and as mostly declaratory
of general international law.
Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has demonstrated a greater willingness to harness mandatory Chapter VII resolutions. It has also reinforced the antiterrorism obligations through the incorporation of the duty to take "effective and practical"
steps to prevent and punish acts of terrorism, a move that serves to consolidate the formation
of a duty of due diligence. ", It is arguable that such a positive duty had been established in
customary international law long before the September 11 th attacks occurred. Security
Council Resolution 1189 of 13 August 1998, which was passed in response to bombings on
the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, "call[ed] upon all States to adopt, in
accordance with international law and as a matter of priority, effective and practical measures for security cooperation, for the prevention of such acts of terrorism, and for the

prosecution and punishment of their perpetrators."' 's The fact that this resolution was not
the product of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter does not, ipso facto, exclude the capacity
of such a resolution to generate customary law through the practice of the States.
C.

APPROXIMATING THE COMPLICITY IN TERRORISM TO AN "ARMED ATTACK"

It may not be excluded that the cumulative effects of duties as established in the Friendly
Relations Resolution and in a series of the Security Council resolutions can be construed
6
as approximating the act of aiding and abetting terrorism to an "armed attack."" Such a
possibility would reinforce the attribution of responsibility for the September 11th attacks
to the Taliban and the claimed right of a victim State to employ forcible defensive measures." 7 This requires further inquiry into the degree of complicity in terrorism through
the concept of "indirect aggression" or "indirect attack."
The principle of non-use of force as recognised in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and
in customary international law should be viewed as proscribing the so-called "indirect

112. The Declarationon Principlesof InternationalLaw Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operationAmong
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Principle 1, para. 8, Annex
25, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 28, U.N. Dec. A/5217 (1970), at 121.
113. Id. prin. 3, para. 2.
114. Relying on the Court's indication in the case of United States Diplomaticand Consular Staff in Tehran
(1980 I.Cj. 3, at 32-33, para. 68). Condorelli refers to the three elements that would cumulatively amount to
such a duty on a State in respect of acts of private individuals: awareness of the need to take action; necessary
means at its disposal to prevent acts of individuals; and failure to apply such means. Luigi Condorelli, The
Imputability to States of Acts of InternationalTerrorism, 19 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HR 233, at 241 (1989).
115. Security Council Resolution 1189 of 13 August 1998, S/RES/ 1189 (1998), para. 5.
116. Compare Kaikobad, supra note 20, at 313.
117. Cassese, supra note 1, at 997.
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'
"Indirect armed force"
armed force" or its more specific element, "indirect aggression."11
can be identified in circumstances where a State allows another State to use its territory as
a training ground or a launching base for an attack against a third State, or in case a State
is unwilling or simply unable to prevent the incursion into a third State of armed bands,
mercenaries or other armed groups operating within its territory. Consistent practice of
Israel"19 demonstrates its willingness to reserve a broad scope of self-defence against indirect
aggression on the basis of the "accumulation of events" theory, with self-defence becoming
close to the form of reprisals. 12° The practice of Turkey relative to its incursions into Iraqi
territory to attack bases of Kurdish armed bands' 2' and of Russia with regard to its crossborder attacks on alleged Chechnyan terrorist bases in Pankissi valley in Georgia,"' also
suggest that these States feel able to do so, tacitly relying on the right of self-defence against
indirect armed attacks.
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter should be considered applicable to "indirect armed
force," especially in terms of its prohibition of not only the use of force but also the threat
of use of force. It remains to be ascertained what form and degree of participation in the
military operation of another State or of irregulars can be regarded as amounting to an
armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, " ' which is set at a more
serious level than that of "the threat or use of force." Article 3(g) of the Definition of Aggression classifies particularly grave forms of assistance to unofficial armed organs as "acts
of aggression," which encompasses an armed attack.'24 As discussed above, while excluding
from the category of an armed attack the mere provision of financial and logistical aids to
rebels in another country, the Court in the Nicaraguacase stated that the sending, by or on
behalf of a State, of irregulars to another State's territory would constitute an armed attack
in view of a scale and effects of their operation comparable to an armed attack by regular

118. See P. Lamberti Zanardi, Indirect MilitaryAggression, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE
111-19 (A. Cassesse ed. 1986); Schachter, supra note 3, at 1625; Randelzhofer, supra note 3, at 119-

OF FORCE

20; and A.

VERDROSS

& B.

SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES VOELKERRECHT-THEORIE UND

PRAxI

481, at 296 (3d

ed. 1984).
119. W. O'Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense in CounterterrorOperations,30 VA. J. INT'L L. 421,
450-451 (1990).
120. D. W. Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1,10 (1972).
121. Dinstein, however, justifies Turkey's action as a form of "extra-territorial law enforcement" based on
self-defence. Dinstein, supra note 3, at 213-21.
122. This was the first incident in which a Georgian civilian was killed by the Russian cross-border air raids.
Natalie Nougayr~de, La Giorgie essuie des bombardements musses etenvoie des troupes dansles gorges de Pankissi,LE
MONDE, Aug. 27, 2002, at 3. In his letter addressed September 12, 2002 to the Security Council and to the
U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, President Putin announced that Russia would reserve the right to take
"inherent right of self-defence" to intervene in Georgia in case the latter does not take specific action against
Chechnyan armed groups. Letter from President Putin, President of Russia, to Kofi Annan, U.N. SecretaryGeneral (Sept. 12, 2002), YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Sept. 13, 2002, at 7.
123. Brownlie accepts that an "armed attack" might encompass "a co-ordinated and general campaign by
powerful bands of irregulars, with obvious or easily proven complicity of the government of a state from which
they operate." He nonetheless considers that stringent compliance with the requirement of proportionality
excludes the right to resort to force against indirect aggression under Article 51, with indirect aggression needed
to be countered by measures of defence not involving cross-frontier military operations. Brownlie, supra note
3, at 278-79.
of aggression "[t]he sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands,
124. Article 3 (g) regards as an act
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as
to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein." G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (1975), Annex, Definition of Aggression, art. 3(g).
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forces.' The Court's reasoning warrants the conclusion that the varying level of an armed
attack is pitched high but capable of accommodating acts of complicity in a terrorist attack,
provided that the nature of the attack is of gravity akin to or cognate with that brought
about by a State and that a sufficiently close connection is established between the State
2
and a non-State actor. ' The present writer does not go so far as to recognise the doctrine
of "indirect aggression," but it is possible to observe that due to the international community's support of, and acquiescence in, the United States and its allied action in Afghanistan, the path of development of international law is verging on the guarded espousal of
27
such a doctrine in exceptional circumstances.'
V. Conclusion
The foregoing examination leads to the conclusion that the military action pursued by
the United States and its allies was justified in line with the newly interpreted mode of the
right of self-defence as recognised both in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and in customary
international law. The armed attack requirement in both sources of law was, within a short
period of time between September 11 and October 7, 2001, modified to include the case
where non-State actors instigate an attack. The legal basis of the resort to armed force has
been complemented and reinforced by Security Council's mandatory Resolution 1373,
which has expressly endorsed the right of self-defence. Further, it might be suggested that
the military action constituted collective countermeasures as form of enforcement, responsive to the breach of obligations erga omnes. According to this view, since the September
1 th attacks could be described as amounting to crimes against humanity in the sense of
12 8
Article 7 of the Rome Statute, breach of the rule prohibiting such crimes would give rise
to the obligations owed to the international community as a whole. 29 At the current stage
of development of international law, this hypothesis, however, must be treated with circumspection in view of the pre-suppositional need to "rehabilitate" armed countermeasures.
As regards the question of the reporting duty and its subsidiary issues of evidence, there
was an encouraging sign that before duly reporting to the Security Council the measures
of self-defence, both the U.S. and the U.K. governments made the case for such measures,
evincing more than a sufficient standard of proof that the al Qaeda organisation was implicated in the September 11th attacks. Such a salutary move reversed the previous tendency

125. Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.)
1986 I.CJ. 14, at 103, para. 195.
126. See also Byers, supra note 1, at 407-08.
127. Such circumstances are where there is a continuing threat of acts of international terrorism, on a scale
comparable to September 11 th attacks, from an identifiable source in another State that proves either unwilling
or unable to take necessary preventive action.
128. It is submitted that reference in Article 7 of the Rome Statute to "[mlurder" in the definition of crimes
against humanity can encompass the September 1 th attacks, insofar as this was committed against civilian
population in a widespread or systematic manner. See also the statement by Mary Robinson, the then U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights, who qualified the attacks of September 11 as "crimes against humanity." U.N. Daily Highlights, Sept. 25, 2001, at http://www.un.org/News/dh/20010925.htm (lastvisited Oct.
22, 2002).
129. Schrijver, supra note 1, at 285. In relation to the NATO's intervention in Kosovo, Cassese also develops
the idea of "forcible countermeasures to prevent crimes against humanity." A. Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur:
Are We Moving towards InternationalLegitimation of Forcible HumanitarianCountermeasuresin the World Community? 1 EuRo. J. INT'L L. 23, 29 (1999).
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of the U.S. administrations to compromise the reporting obligations under Article 51,
reinforcing the obligation on a State invoking self-defence to adduce convincing evidence.
It is safe to conclude that the adjustment of international law to the new political reality
after the September 11th attacks has remained within the tolerable bounds of pre-existing
law of self-defence. This concluding observation, however, would not be the same if following the disclosure of evidence of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction 3" and of more
dubious evidence suggesting Iraq's alleged link with al Qaeda, 3' both the United States
and the United Kingdom unilaterally start to engage in pre-emptive attacks against Iraq
outside the framework of the Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.

130. See Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction-The Assessment of the British Government, published by Tony
Blair on Sept. 24, 2002, available at http://specials.ft.com/spdocs/FT3GORGK16D.pdf (last visited Oct. 22,
2002).
131. James Harding et al., US seeks to prove Iraq-al-Qaedalink, FIN. TiMES, Sept. 26, 2002.
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